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Civil Justice Reform and the 
Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure 
Carl To bias* 
The recent civil war ripping apart Yugoslavia is a trenchant reminder 
of the horrors of balkanization. Without trivializing the Yugoslavian 
experience, the term balkanization usefully applies to developments in 
American federal civil procedure that now threaten the continued via-
bility of a uniform, simple system of procedure. Thirty-four federal 
courts' nascent implementation of the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) 
of 1990 will exacerbate these developments; indeed, if the remaining 
sixty districts that must issue civil justice expense and delay reduction 
plans by December 1993 fail to halt this trend, the Act will further 
fragment procedure. 1 This article cautions those responsible for main-
taining an efficacious procedural system that they must slow balkani-
zation, lest civil procedure become even more disuniform and complex. 
The piece first explores numerous developments in federal civil pro-
cedure that fostered the balkanization of a once uniform, simple system. 
It then analyzes the most recent manifestations of the phenomenon, as 
witnessed in congressional passage of the CJRA and thirty-four districts' 
initial implementation of the statute, and finds that civil justice reform 
will worsen the prior procedural developments. The paper next evaluates 
the implications of enhanced balkanization and concludes that it will 
detrimentally affect federal court judges, lawyers and litigants. 
I. THE ROAD TO BALKANIZATION 
A. Adoption of the Original Federal Rules 
The lawyers who crafted the original 1938 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure consciously responded to the difficulties that common law 
• Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Melissa Harrison, Sally 
Johnson, Derik Pomeroy, Lucy Rudbach, and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions; Cecelia 
Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece; and the Harris Trust for generous, 
continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089-98 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. 1992)). Balkanization, as used in this article, is the 
fragmentation of federal civil procedure, which is manifested more specifically in the increasingly 
disuniform and complex nature of the procedural system. 
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and code practice and procedure had imposed. 2 The drafters specifically 
attempted to minimize the highly technical requirements of the earlier 
procedural systems, thereby ameliorating, if not eliminating, the "sport-
ing theory of justice. " 3 Charles Clark, the Reporter for the first 
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, and the members of that 
Committee apparently had numerous procedural tenets in mind when 
they wrote the initial Federal Rules.4 Most relevant to increasing bal-
kanization was the drafters' intent to devise a code of federal civil 
procedure that was simple and uniform.5 They meant to achieve sim-
plicity, for example, by sharply reducing the significance of pleading 
and by limiting the number of steps in a lawsuit. 6 The drafters attempted 
to achieve uniformity, for instance, by prescribing the same procedures 
for all federal district courts and practically all federal civil cases by 
merging law and equity, and by encouraging the states to model their 
civil procedures on the federal counterparts. 7 
B. The Golden Age: The Initial Three Decades of Judicial 
Application 
The Civil Rules Committee and the federal judiciary were able to 
maintain simplicity and uniformity in federal civil procedure for ap-
2. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 914-21, 926-73 (1987); Carl 
Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 CORNELL L. REv. 
270, 272-73 (1989). 
3. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 433, 439 (1986); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 404-06 (Pt. I, 1906) 
("sporting theory"); Subrin, supra note 2, at 948-73. See generally CHARLES E. CLARK, PROCEDURE 
- THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE (1965). 
4. E.g., Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the 
Rules, 84 YALE L. J. 718 passim (1975); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in 
Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 494, 502-15 (1986); Tobias, supra note 2, at 272-77; see also Resnik, 
supra, at 498-99 (discussing the difficulties of divining intent of drafters who worked a half-
century ago); Tobias, supra, at 274 (same). 
5. Uniformity is a subset of simplicity. The drafters had other major objectives. They also 
intended to afford attorneys substantial, and judges limited, control over lawsuits; to subordinate 
procedure to substance; and to emphasize merits-based resolution of cases. For discussion of these 
and other important objectives of the drafters, see Resnik, supra note 4, at 502-15; Stephen N. 
Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 61 A.B.A. J. 1648 passim (1981); Tobias, 
supra note 2, at 272-77. 
6. Subrin, supra note 5, at 1649-50; Tobias, supra note 2, at 274; see also Marcus, supra 
note 3, at 439-40. 
7. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 
435, 435 (1958) (encouraging states); Subrin, supra note 5, at 1650 (same procedures and merger); 
Tobias, supra note 2, at 274-75 (same). 
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proximately thirty years after the adoption of the original Federal Rules 
in 1938.8 The federal judiciary experienced comparatively little difficulty 
applying the Rules and praised their efficacy.9 The judges were able to 
preserve simplicity through, for example, flexible, pragmatic enforce-
ment of the provisions governing pleading and by leaving discovery 
essentially to lawyer self-regulation. 10 Correspondingly, the federal judges 
maintained and fostered uniformity because, for instance, they prom-
ulgated a relatively small number of local rules, and even fewer local 
rules that conflicted with the Federal Rules, 11 while numerous states 
premised their procedures on the federal analogues. 12 
Civil procedure, however, was not universally uniform and simple. 
The open-ended, simple scheme of discovery, particularly in complex 
cases, created certain difficulties, such as overly broad requests for 
information and evasion of discovery requests. 13 Moreover, a number 
of states, especially those, such as New York, that had long relied on 
code procedure, either did not subscribe to the federal regime or 
borrowed minimally from the Federal Rules. 14 
C. Increased Balkanization Since the Mid-1970s 
Numerous developments have led to balkanization of federal civil 
procedure since the mid-1970s, particularly over the last decade. During 
8. Tobias, supra note 2, at 277-78; see also Resnik, supra note 4, at 516. See generally 
Symposium, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435 (1958). 
9. Charles Clark, as the Advisory Committee Reporter and a judge on the Second Circuit, 
orchestrated some of this. Marcus, supra note 3, at 435; Tobias, supra note 2, at 277-78; see also 
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944); Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in 
the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 47 (1957). 
10. See Marcus, supra note 3, at 439-40, 445-46 (pleading); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 397 (1982) (discovery). But cf. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of 
the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pt. 1), 81 HARV. 
L. REv. 356, 356-407 (1967-68) (rules 19, 23 and 24 read inflexibly). 
11. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, 
Divergence and Emerging Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2016-19 (1989). 
12. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-substantive Virtues in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2237 (1989); John B. Oakley & Arthur F. 
Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 
61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1377-78 (1986). Intrastate uniformity is less relevant to the issues 
considered in this piece, although it was an important goal of the drafters. Subrin, supra note 5, 
at 1650. 
13. See, e.g., New Dyckman Theater Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheus Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203, 
206 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); see also Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 
CowM. L. REv. 480 passim (1958) (contemporaneous account); Subrin, supra note 2, at 982-84 
(subsequent account). 
14. See Oakley & Coon, supra note 12, at 1377-78. But cf. Hazard, supra note 12, at 2237 
(some urban states borrowed significantly from Federal Rules). 
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the mid-1970s, many judges, led by Chief Justice Warren Burger, and 
some writers began to perceive that the federal courts were experiencing 
a litigation explosion. 15 These observers contended that lawyers and 
litigants were filing a substantial number of civil cases, too few of 
which had merit. 16 Numerous members of the Supreme Court expressed 
concern about litigation abuse, especially of the discovery process, and 
encourage<;! lower federal courts to sanction attorneys and parties who 
behave improperly during lawsuits. 17 
1. Managerial Judging 
A number of federal trial judges, particularly in urban districts, such 
as the Northern District of California, responded to the perceived 
litigation explosion and litigation abuse by employing numerous prac-
tices under the rubric of "managerial judging." 18 Many judges partic-
ipated more actively in expediting dispute resolution. They used pretrial 
conferences to set lawsuits' pace, to structure questions at issue, or to 
foster settlement, concomitantly experimenting with Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR). 19 Numerous judges limited discovery's scope and 
timing while imposing sanctions for litigation abuse. 20 A number of 
courts developed novel procedural techniques, such as mandatory sum-
mary jury trials, particularly for resolving complex cases.21 The Manual 
for Complex Litigation correspondingly prescribed numerous different 
15: E.g., Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. - A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 
in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23 passim (A. Leo Levin 
& Russell Wheeler eds. 1979) [hereinafter THE PoUND CONFERENCE); Francis R. Kirkham, Complex 
Civil Litigation - Have Good Intentions Gone A wry?, in THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra at 209, 
211-12; see also Tobias, supra note 2, at 287-89 (discussing debate over litigation explosion). 
16. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979); Arthur R. Miller, The 
Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. I, 1-12 (1984). 
17. See, e.g., National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 
(1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); Supreme Court 
Order of the United States, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 (April 19, 1980) (amending the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
18. See Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 647. 675-78 (1988). See generally STEVEN FLANDERS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CASE 
MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1977). 
19. See, e.g., Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Movement, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 424, 435-36 (1986) (ADR); Robert F. Peckham, The 
Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 
69 CAL. L. REv. 770, 770-89 (1981) (remaining propositions); Resnik, supra note 10, at 391-400 
(same). 
20. See Peckham, supra note 19, at 800-04; Resnik, supra note IO, at 391-400. 
21. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & JOHN E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED 
ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial Ctr. rev. ed. 1983); Frank E. 
A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, Ill (1976). 
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procedures for treating specific types of complex lawsuits, such as 
employment discrimination, patent and antitrust litigation. 22 
The 1983 revisions of the Federal Rules and the 1985 issuance of the 
Manual for Complex Litigation Second effectively codified virtually all 
of the managerial judging techniques that courts had created. 23 The 
1983 amendments to Federal Rules 11, 16 and 26 substantially increased 
complexity and disuniformity. For example, Rule 11 enhances com-
plexity by making pleading more technical; all three provisions com-
plicate litigation by multiplying the steps in a lawsuit and by imposing 
a great number of, and more onerous, responsibilities on attorneys, 
such as mandatory participation in discovery and pretrial conferences.24 
Correspondingly, Rule 16 increases disuniformity by suggesting that 
courts attune procedures to specific cases and that individual judges 
create their own prototypical scheduling orders for various categories 
of cases.25 The Manual for Complex Litigation Second similarly erodes 
uniformity by recommending that courts treat nearly all complex law-
suits differently than simpler, routine cases and that judges adapt 
diverse, particular procedures to specific classifications of complex 
litigation. 26 An assumption underlying both the 1983 revisions and the 
second edition of the Manual is that judges would tailor procedures, 
frequently on an ad hoc basis, to individual lawsuits.27 
2. The Proliferation of Local Rules 
A closely related source of increasingly balkanized federal civil pro-
cedure is the remarkable proliferation of local rules that has occurred 
since the 1938 Federal Rules' adoption but that has grown almost 
exponentially over the last two decades. An important means by which 
22. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §§ 33.1, 33.5-.6 (5th ed. 1982). See generally Alan 
J. Simons, The Manual for Complex Litigation: More Rules or Mere Recommendations?, 62 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 473 (1988). 
23. See generally Supreme Court Order of the United States, 461 U.S. 1097 (April 28, 1983) 
(amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); MANUAL FoR COMPLEX LmGATION, SECOND (1985). 
24. See Subrin, supra note 5, at 1650; Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 
Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 933-52 (1991). See generally 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 
1984). 
25. See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007, 1011-13 (!st Cir. 
1988); Subrin, supra note 5, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 24, at 940-48. 
26. See Subrin, supra note 5, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 2, at 292 n.148. 
27. Subrin, supra note 5, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 2, at 292 n.148. This deprives the 
Federal Rules of their efficacy as a uniform model for states while jeopardizing intrastate and 
interstate procedural uniformity. Subrin, supra note 5, at 1650. 
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courts accomplished much managerial judging, particularly before 1983, 
was through the promulgation of local rules.28 Courts experimented 
with various techniques by adopting local rules that frequently conflicted 
with the Federal Rules, provisions in the United States Code, and local 
rules or other procedures governing civil litigation in the remaining 
ninety-three federal districts. For instance, during the 1970s, the North-
ern District of California adopted a "complex rule" governing pretrial 
procedures.29 The rule required that attorneys participate in "prelimi-
nary meetings in addition to the pretrial conference" and that they 
prepare a joint pretrial statement comprised of twenty-three items, 
including matters such as the disputed factual issues and settlement 
discussions. 30 The promulgation of local rules, within and outside the 
context of managerial judging, has proceeded unabated since the mid-
1970s. 
In the mid-1980s, the United States Judicial Conference recognized 
the problems that the proliferation of local rules was creating and 
commissioned the Local Rules Project. 31 The Conference instructed the 
Project to assemble and organize all of the. local rules, standing orders, 
and any additional local procedural requirements that performed similar 
functions. 32 The Conference also requested that the Project analyze 
issues that the growth of local rules created and suggest solutions to 
solve any difficulties discovered. 33 
The Local Rules Project issued its assessment of local civil procedures 
in 1989.34 The Project found that the ninety-four federal districts had 
promulgated more than 5,000 local rules, many of which conflicted 
with the Federal Rules and most of which were inconsistent across the 
districts. 35 Nearly all of the districts adopted local rules governing 
pretrial procedures, particularly pretrial conferences and discovery. Nu-
merous districts employed a host of specific procedures, such as precise 
28. See Peckham, supra note 19, at 773-77; Resnik, supra note 10, at 399; supra notes 18-
21 and accompanying text. 
29. Peckham, supra note 19, at 776-77; see also Marcus, supra note 18, at 675-78. 
30. N.D. CAL. R. 235-7, reprinted in Peckham, supra note 19, at 776 n.30. 
31. For a summary of the Local Rules Project, see Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role of 
Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62 (1989). 
32. See Coquillette et al., supra note 31, at 63; Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, 
Project Director of Local Rules Project (Feb. 21, 1992). 
33. See Coquillette et al., supra note 31, at 63; Telephone Interview, supra note 32. 
34. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (1989). 
35. See Coquillette et al., supra note 31, at 62-65; Subrin, supra note 11, at 2020-26. 
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numerical limitations on interrogatories or tracking systems for resolving 
relatively routine, simple cases. 36 The Project also discovered substantial 
variation quantitatively and qualitatively among the ninety-four districts. 
For instance, the Central District of California had promulgated thirty-
one local rules with 434 sub-rules, augmented by 275 standing orders, 
while the Middle District of Georgia had adopted a lone local rule and 
only eleven standing orders.37 
Local rules are not the only local procedures that have contributed 
to balkanization. The Local Rules Project found that numerous other 
procedures, typically denominated standing orders, general orders, or 
minute orders govern practice in the ninety-four districts. 38 Moreover, 
a number of districts have experimented informally with certain pro-
cedures that apparently were not formally embodied in a written doc-
ument. 39 The Judicial Conference responded to the findings of the Local 
Rules Project by issuing an order that instructed the federal districts 
to make all of their local procedures consistent with the Federal Rules 
and that offered other helpful suggestions, such as recommending that 
the numbering of local rules comport with the Federal Rules.40 
3. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988 and Local Rule 
Revision 
Congress apparently intended to treat some of the difficulties that 
the local rules' proliferation had created when it passed certain provi-
sions of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988.41 
36. E.g., U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E. DIST. OF N.Y., CIVU JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN 2 (Dec. 17, 1991) [hereinafter E. DIST. N.Y. PLAN); U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE 
DIST. OF WYO., CIVU JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2 (Dec. 31, 1991) [hereinafter 
WYO. PLAN]; see also Subrin, supra note 11, at 2020-26. 
3 7. See Coquillette et al., supra note 31, at 62. 
38. See Telephone Interview, supra note 32; Telephone Interview with Stephen N. Subrin, 
Consultant to the Local Rules Project (Feb. 15, 1992). 
39. For example, the Montana Federal District Court experimented with the co-equal assign-
ment of civil cases to Article III judges and magistrate judges. U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF 
MONT., CrvIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 3-4 (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter MONT. 
PLAN); Carl Tobias, The Montana Federal Civil Justice Plan, 53 MONT. L. REV. 91, 93 n.9 (1992). 
Correspondingly, the Wyoming Federal District Court required "parties to make every reasonable 
and good faith effort to resolve discovery disputes before seeking assistance from the Court" and 
to so certify in writing. WYO. PLAN, supra note 36, at 13. 
40. Telephone Interviews, supra notes 32, 38. Neither the Project Director nor its Consultant 
believes that there has been substantial nationwide compliance. Id.; see also infra notes 47-49 and 
accompanying text. 
41. H.R. REP. No. 100-889, IOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 27-29, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5982, 5987-89. For the text of the 1988 Act, see Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice 
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
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The statute required that all ninety-four districts appoint advisory 
committees to assist the courts in developing local rules and imposed 
public notice and comment procedures on courts that promulgate new, 
or revise existing, local rules. 42 
The creation of these committees, which must study local procedures 
and make recommendations for change, as needed, and the prescr~ption 
of formal procedures for adopting or modifying local rules will afford 
several benefits. The rule revision entities and the procedures should 
regularize the process for modifying local rules, open the amendment 
process to public scrutiny, and perhaps reduce reliance on local pro-
cedural provisions that are not local rules, such as standing orders.43 
The establishment of local advisory committees and the provision of 
local rule revision procedures, however, might enhance balkanization 
for several important reasons. Balkanization may grow notwithstanding 
the improvements, such as increased regularization, that the 1988 Ju-
dicial Improvements Act and the Local Rules Project were meant to 
effect. The local committees essentially could replace the expert, and 
ostensibly neutral, Civil Rules Committee, whose charge is to study the 
Federal Rules from the perspective of what is best for all ninety-four 
districts that comprise the civil justice system and to develop proposals 
for change in those provisions that will be most efficacious.44 In 1988, 
Congress essentially substituted for the Civil Rules Committee ninety-
four relatively amateur entities, composed of local federal court prac-
titioners appointed by the judges of those courts. Most of those 
practitioners are likely to be relatively unconcerned about balkanization 
and more interested in proposing local rules that are solicitous, and 
even protective, of the needs of the local federal judges, bar, and 
litigants.45 For instance, some federal districts have excludes! lawyers 
42. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2077 (1988); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: 
Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 799-800 
(1991). See generally JACK WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKINO PROCEDURES (1977). 
43. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text; cf. Mullenix, supra note 42, at 797-802 
(warning of risks entailed in opening Federal Rules' amendment process to public scrutiny). 
44. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 331-32, 2073 (1988). This is an ideal, theoretical, and somewhat rosy 
view of the Civil Rules Committee. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of 
Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 2067, 2073-87 (1989); Mullenix, supra .note 42, at 799, 802, 
855-57. But see Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The 
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1935-41 (view of Committee as less neutral, 
political entity); Tobias, supra note 2, at 310-13, 337 (similar ideas). 
45. I am merely saying that most local advisory committees will be more sensitive to, and 
favorably disposed toward, the needs of local lawyers, litigants and judges than the Civil Rules 
Committee would be. See generally Marc S. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: 
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admitted to practice in other districts on the basis of discrepancies in 
local requirements for admission to the bar. 46 
The creation of the local advisory committees and the concomitant 
implementation of new rule-amending procedures correspondingly could 
increase balkanization by encouraging the additional proliferation of 
local rules. Many of those local rules will be inconsistent across the 
ninety-four federal districts, and some of the local rules are likely to 
contravene the Federal Rules and provisions in the United States Code. 
The local advisory committees and district judges apparently have 
experienced considerable difficulty ascertaining precisely how to define 
what constitutes a conflict or an inconsistency, especially between their 
local rules and the Federal Rules.47 These nice questions regarding 
conflicts may partially explain why so much inconsistency remains 
today, despite the efforts of the Judicial Conference and the Local 
Rules Project to eliminate conflicts48 and of the judicial councils that 
Congress expressly instructed in the 1988 statute to minimize inconsis-
tency .49 Local rule revision also could increase conflicts because any 
procedures promulgated bypass the national rule-amending process that 
enables Congress to maintain consistency. so 
4. The 1991 Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules 
Another potential source of balkanization is the Civil Rules Com-
mittee's 1991 issuance of proposals to amend eighteen Federal Rules, 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974). Most writers, 
including the authors whose works are cited supra note 44, agree that the Committee possesses 
considerable procedural expertise, even though the writers may disagree over how the Committee 
exercises that expertise. See generally Harold S. Lewis, The Excessive History of Federal Rule 
15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1507 (1987). 
46. E.g., Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987); see also Coquillette et al., supra note 31, 
at 64; Carl Tobias, Federal Court Procedural Reform in Montana, 52 MONT. L. ij.Ev. 433, 436 
n.14 (1991). 
47. Telephone Interviews, supra notes 32, 38; see also Coquillette et al., supra note 31, at 
64; infra notes 103, 119-21 and accompanying text. 
48. See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text for a review of the inconsistency among 
local rules. 
49. 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1988). The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988 is discussed supra in 
the text accompanying notes 41-43 and infra note 102. 
50. The national rule-amending process affords Congress seven months to analyze and act 
upon proposals to amend the Federal Rules that the Supreme Court transmits. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 
(Supp. 1990). The creation of ninety-four local advisory committees and local amendment 
procedures substantially complicates efforts to monitor rule revision activity. Both intra-govern-
mental monitoring entities (such as the Congress, the circuit judicial councils, and the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts), and extra-governmental entities (such as the Alliance 
for Justice) will experience difficulties monitoring ninety-five rule-revision entities, rather than one 
Civil Rules Committee. See Mullenix, supra note 42 (discussing the impact of participatory rule-
drafting). 
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perhaps the most ambitious rule revision effort in the half-century 
history of the Rules. 51 Some specific recommendations, if adopted, will 
by definition increase balkanization. For example, the recently-formu-
lated suggestions to change two provisions in Federal Rule 26 and one 
in Federal Rule 54 expressly authorize the federal districts to prescribe 
exceptions to the federal requirements in local rules. 52 Similarly prob-
lematic was the Civil Rules Committee's proposal to amend Federal 
Rule 83(b), which would have permitted district courts, with Judicial 
Conference approval, to· promulgate experimental local rules that are 
inconsistent with the Federal Rules or Title 28 of the United States 
Code, if they are only effective for a five-year period.53 This suggestion 
would have intrinsically enhanced disuniformity and complexity, al-
though the proposal and its accompanying advisory committee note 
apparently constituted a measured approach that attempted to balance 
the problem of balkanization with the need for experimentation. The 
Standing Committee decided not to send this proposal forward during 
June 1992 in the apparent belief that ongoing CJRA experimentation 
was sufficient. 54 
II. THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
The balkanization that civil justice reform promises to effect will 
enhance, and even may eclipse, the increased disuniformity and com-
plexity attributable to the various sources above. Congressional passage 
of the CJRA in late 1990 and the initial important step in its imple-
51. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Preliminary 
Draft]; Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1992, at I. 
52. 1991 Preliminary Draft, supra note 51, at 91-92, 137-38 (proposing amendments to Rules 
26(b)(2) and 54(2)(D)). The Standing Committee subscribed to these proposals in June and 
forwarded them, as did the Judicial Conference in Sepember. Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Proposed Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms (July 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Proposed Amendments]; Judicial 
Conference of the United States, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Clvil Procedure 
(Sept. 1992); see also Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: 
Is It Again Time for Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155 passim (1991) (analyzing the proposed amendment 
to Rule 26). 
53. 1991 Preliminary Draft, supra note 51, at 152-55 (proposing amendment to Rule 83(b)). 
See generally A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 
U. PA. L. REv. 1567 (1991) (discussing the impact of experimentation similar to that contemplated 
with the proposed changes in Rule 83); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal 
for Restricted Field Experiments, LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS., Summer 1988, at 67 (discussing the 
impact of adopting a program that allows for local experimentation). A concomitant of balkan-
ization, which is rarely a source of the phenomenon, is many federal courts' application of the 
Federal Rules in ways that increase disuniformity or complexity. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fireworks 
on the 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 73 JUDICATURE 4, 6 (1989); 
Tobias, supra note 2, at 296-335; infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text. 
54. See 1992 Proposed Amendments, supra note 52. 
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mentation with thirty-four districts' issuance of civil justice expense and 
delay plans a year later are the latest manifestations of enhanced 
balkanization, and civil justice reform ultimately could contribute most 
significantly to the phenomenon, especially after all ninety-four districts 
fully effectuate the Act. 
Congress intentionally or inadvertently drafted the CJRA, and courts 
that sought Early Implementation District Court (EIDC) status practi-
cally implemented the statute, in numerous ways that will exacerbate 
balkanization. The potential for increased balkanization should not 
come as a surprise because Congress premised essential aspects of the 
CJRA on many of the earlier procedural developments, such as the 
expansion of managerial judging and the proliferation of local rules, 
that had already substantially increased fragmentation. Perhaps the 
most striking facets of the CJRA's enactment are congressional will-
ingness to stamp its imprimatur on these general developments in 
procedure and to invoke those specific entities and procedures that have 
fostered balkanization while encouraging every one of the federal dis-
tricts to employ the precise instrumentalities and procedures that have 
promoted disuniformity and complexity.ss These considerations warrant 
more comprehensive analysis of civil justice reform than of the prior 
procedural developments on which Congress based important particulars 
of the statute. This section first examines those entities responsible for 
implementing the CJRA and their respective duties and the bodies 
charged with overseeing these efforts. It then thoroughly evaluates the 
Act and its implementation by the thirty-four EIDCs. s6 
A. Implementing and Oversight Entities and Their Responsibilities 
1. Implementing Entities and Their Duties 
Congress selected certain entities to effectuate the CJRA and assigned 
them specific responsibilities that have increased, and will foster, bal-
55. Passage of the CJRA could be a watershed for Congress. The federal j)ldiciary had 
expressed concern about a litigation explosion, litigation abuse and civil justice reform for many 
years. Supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, Congress resisted most of the 
judiciary's requests for substantial procedural reform in part out of apparent concern that the 
courts were applying procedure in ways which undermine substantive statutes. Tobias, supra note 
24, at 961-63; see also infra notes 164, 172 and accompanying text. The CJRA could enable the 
judiciary to employ procedures in ways that erode substantive legislation. 
56. I do not mean to be critical of the Congress or the EIDCs. It is virtually impossible to 
quarrel with the admirable goal of reducing expense and delay in civil litigation. Moreover, the 
unprecedented introspection in all ninety-four units of the civil justice system will provide invaluable 
information on local legal cultures. Furthermore, the advisory groups and EIDCs have labored 
mightily to implement procedures that will reduce expense and delay. I am concerned about certain 
ways in which Congress structured the Act, some means that Congress employed for attaining its 
goals, and the ways in which quite a few EIDCs have implemented the statute. 
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kanization. Congress instructed all ninety-four districts that comprise 
the civil justice system to adopt civil justice plans for reducing expense 
and delay in civil litigation. "The purposes of each plan are to facilitate 
deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, 
improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive 
resolutions of civil disputes. " 57 
The districts must formulate their plans after considering the reports 
and recommendations of local advisory groups. ss Congress required that 
the chief judges of the districts appoint these groups, which were to be 
balanced and include lawyers and litigants who appear in ,the trial 
courts. 59 The groups must undertake studies of local conditions, such 
as the state of the courts' dockets, and make procedural suggestions 
that the districts, in consultation with the groups, must consider and 
might include in the plans. 60 • 
The manner prescribed for these groups' appointment, the entities as 
constituted, and their statutory mandates, as implemented, therefore, 
could have fostered balkanization. 61 For example, some groups that 
advised EIDCs consisted primarily of defense counsel, and few groups 
included very many resource-poor litigants. 62 Congress specifically di-
rected the groups to perform comprehensive evaluations of the courts' 
civil and criminal dockets; to consider the specific circumstances and 
needs of the districts, their litigants and the parties' counsel; to make 
procedural recommendations that guarantee that all three would con-
tribute significantly to reducing expenses and delay in civil litigation, 
thereby increasing access; and to consult with judges when they for-
mulate civil justice plans.63 
57. 28 u.s.c. § 471 (1992). 
58. Id. § 473(a). 
59. Id. § 478. 
60. Id. § 472. 
61. See id. §§ 471-72, 478. See generally Tobias, supra note 46, at 437-41 (discussing the 
implementation of the CJRA). These CJRA advisory groups are distinct from other entities, 
variously denominated local advisory or local rules committees. See supra notes 41-46 and 
accompanying text. For additional information on the difficulty of monitoring mult~le entities, 
see supra note 50. 
62. See, e.g., U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Ind., Report of the Civil Justice Advisory 
Group, at i (Dec. 1991) (group membership includes more defense counsel than plaintiffs' counsel); 
U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Mont., Report of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group, 
at frontispiece (Aug. 1991) (group membership includes few resource-poor litigants); U.S. Dist. 
Ct. for the Dist. of Wyo., Advisory Group Report and Recommended Plan, at frontispiece (Dec. 
1991) (group membership includes primarily defense counsel and "defendants"). See generally 
Galanter, supra note 45 (reasoning that wealthy litigants and repeat litigants have advantages over 
a party who only occasionally litigates a case). 
63. 28 U.S.C. § 472(b) (Supp. 1992). 
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Given the advisory groups' composition and statutory instructions, it 
was predictable that numerous groups would issue reports that evinced 
less concern about enhanced balkanization than about proposing what 
they perceived would be preferable for the trial judges who named 
them and for lawyers and parties in their own districts. 64 The groups' 
reports and recommendations confirm these hypotheses. A number of 
groups suggested procedures that would somehow favor local interests 
at the expense of national uniformity or simplicity and increase bal-
kanization. For example, several advisory groups propos~d that their 
districts enforce local rules more strictly. 65 
Many of the EIDCs, upon receiving the groups' reports and recom-
mendations, prescribed procedures that enhance balkanization appar-
ently for numerous reasons similar to the advisory groups. For instance, 
most federal judges, as former practitioners in their own districts, may 
have the same concerns about local factors as those of the groups. 
Similarly, federal judges may be attentive to other district-specific 
considerations, while they wish to implement procedures that they 
believe are most suitable for local courts. 
Congress correspondingly chose to place nearly total responsibility 
for the CJRA's implementation in the ninety-four districts and assigned 
to judges obligations that could have fostered, and did promote, 
balkanization. The eleven principles, guidelines, and techniques of 
litigation management and cost and delay reduction that the Act states 
districts must consider and may adopt inherently increase disuniformity 
and complexity.66 For example, each district in the national civil justice 
system can selectively adopt varying combinations of the enumerated 
principles, guidelines, and techniques and any other procedures that it 
deems appropriate. In light of these factors, which seem important to 
many judges, and the congressional requirements, it is not surprising 
that most EIDCs adopted plans which exhibited less concern about 
fragmentation of national procedure than about instituting procedures 
64. To some readers, this may seem crudely instrumental. I only mean to say that the groups 
are less expert and less concerned about maintaining national uniformity and simplicity than, for 
example, the Civil Rules Committee. See supra note 45; infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
65. E.g., U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E. DIST. OF CAL., Crvu JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN 3 (Dec. 31, 1991); U.S. DIST. AND BA."IKR. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF IDAHO, Crvu 
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN l (Dec. l, 1991) [hereinafter IDAIIO PLAN). Some 
districts have adopted additional procedures that seem to favor local interests. E.g. IDAIIO PLAN, 
supra, at 12 (using settlement weeks to encourage resolution before trial); WYO. PLAN, supra note 
36, at 7 (providing for stacking trials). Similarly, some federal districts have excluded lawyers 
from other districts on the basis of discrepencies in bar admissions requirements. Supra note 46 
and accompanying text. 
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. 1992); infra notes 130-54 and accompanying text. 
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they considered responsive to local needs and that the plans displayed 
marked variability. For instance, the Eastern Districts .of Arkansas and 
Virginia issued brief plans that included virtually no new procedures.67 
In comparison, the Eastern District of Texas published an equally terse 
document that prescribed several innovative, provocative procedures 
that could increase balkanization, while the Massachusetts District 
adopted a seventy-page plan that has a number of procedures that may 
enhance complexity. 68 
2. Oversight Entities 
Congress also selected instrumentalities to oversee the CJRA's imple-
mentation and assigned them general, unclear responsibilities, making 
it unlikely that the entities would vigorously respond to the increased 
balkanizatiOn that the statute fosters. The organizations that have 
oversight duties are circuit committees, comprised of the chief circuit 
judge and all chief district judges in each circuit; the Judicial Confer-
ence, which has delegated its obligations to the Judicial Conference 
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, chaired 
by Chief District Judge Robert Parker; and Congress itself. 69 
a. Circuit Committees 
Many members of the circuit committees could be reluctant to assess 
plans closely, much less require modifications that would limit balkan-
ization in procedures adopted by districts in their circuits. Numerous 
chief circuit judges apparently have def erred to chief district judges in 
the chief judges' discharge of responsibilities to adopt plans and to 
oversee those promulgated, because the chief district judges individually 
67. See U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E. DIST. OF ARK., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 30, 1991); U.S. DIST. CT. FORE. DIST. OF VA., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE 
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 16, 1991). Each plan is shorter than fifteen pages. 
68. See U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF MASS., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION 
PLAN (Nov. 18, 1991) [hereinafter MASS. PLAN]; U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THEE. DIST. OF TEX., CIVIL 
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 20. 1991) [hereinafter E. DIST. OF TEX. 
PLAN). 
69. 28 U.S.C. § 474 (Supp. 1992). The Case Management Subcommittee of the Committee 
technically has initial responsibility. For convenience, this article refers to both as the Committee, 
except when the distinction makes a difference. 10versight entities do not increase balkanization; 
they simply may fail to limit it. I accord the oversight entities comparatively thorough treatment 
here, because I do not reexamine them. 
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and collectively have greater experience with federal civil litigation at 
the trial court level and within the circuits' districts.70 
Chief district judges, when fulfilling their duties as committee mem-
bers, may have certain "conflicts of interest." One major conflict 
inheres in each judge's obligation to adopt a plan for that judge's 
district and to oversee plans that every other chief district judge in the 
circuit formulates. These district judges might not wish to scrutinize, 
or demand changes in, procedures that the judges could be contem-
plating or even may have instituted or view as relatively unproblematic, 
because the evaluators are less concerned about increased balkanization 
than about what they consider best for their own districts.71 
Some chief district judges, like a number of chief circuit judges, 
could believe that they lack sufficient familiarity with local conditions 
in the districts being reviewed.72 Additional chief district judges, out of 
professional or personal respect for individuals who occupy identical 
positions in the federal judicial hierarchy, . may assess plans def eren-
tially. 73 One chief district judge cogently summarized certain practical-
ities of circuit committee review: 
Our Chief District Judges hate to be very critical of the Plan of 
one of our fellows and for that ·reason rubber-stamp approval, 
without suggestions, is most likely. I think that the Circuit Judges 
are going to have to be the ones that do the real evaluations, and 
as a general rule, they don't have much experience in our problems. 74 
The CJRA and its legislative history provide highly generalized, 
unclear guidance for circuit committees in conducting oversight. Both 
tersely prescribe the circuit committees' responsibilities; neither expressly 
states how closely, or for precisely what purposes, the committees are 
70. Numerous chief circuit judges also may work with a number of the chief district judges 
on circuit councils. See 28 U.S.C. § 332 (Supp. 1992); infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
71. The proliferation of local rules indicates that many federal judges are relatively uncon-
cerned about increased balkanization. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text. In fairness, 
a number of judges also may be more concerned about achieving the CJRA's goals than increasing 
balkanization. 
72. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
73. Chief district judges may defer even though circuit councils, in discharging their respon-
sibility to ensure consistency between local rules and the Federal Rules, frequently take action 
that is as delicate as that which the CJRA contemplates. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332, 474 (Supp. 1992); 
infra notes 75, 80-81 and accompanying text. 
74. Letter from Clarence A. Brimmer, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the 
District of Wyoming, to Carl Tobias (Apr. 10, 1992) (on file with author); cf Letter from Avern 
Cohn, District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, to Carl 
Tobias (Apr. 20, 1992) (expressing belief that committees lack resources to evaluate, research and 
resolve certain issues) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cohn Letter]. 
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to evaluate plans, or specifically mentions balkanization, complexity, 
or disuniformity. For instance, section 474(a) provides that every com-
mittee shall "review each plan and report submitted . . . and make 
such suggestions for additional actions or modified actions ... as the 
committee considers appropriate for reducing cost and delay in civil 
litigation" in the particular district, and the legislative history essentially 
replicates the statute. 75 Given the cryptic nature of this congressional 
grant, numerous committees may be unable to ascertain exactly what 
Congress intended that they do. The circuit committees also could be 
concerned about their power to analyze and suggest changes in certain 
plan provisions, especially those that implicate judicial authority, 76 such 
as the districts' adoption of procedures that conflict with the Federal 
Rules.77 
The circuit committees have compiled varied reviews. Some commit-
tees apparently have not performed very rigorous assessments of the 
plans, choosing to rely substantially on guidance prepared for their use 
by the Judicial Conference with the assistance of the Federal Judicial 
Center. 78 Relatively few committees made recommendations for "ad-
ditional actions or modified actions [that they deemed] appropriate for 
reducing cost and delay in civil litigation, " 79 much less provided sugges-
tions that would limit balkanization. A small number of circuits seem-
ingly misunderstood which entity was to discharge this oversight function. 
A few circuits apparently employed existing circuit judicial councils, 
constituted for different purposes with dissimilar membership under 
Section 332 of Title 28 of the United States Code, rather than the 
circuit committees that section 474 of the Act created to conduct CJRA 
reviews. 80 Indeed, one Circuit Executive even reviewed the plans that 
15. 28 U.S.C. § 474(a) (Supp. 1992). For the legislative history of§ 474, see Senate Comm. 
on Judiciary, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, S. Rep. No. 101-416, !Olst Cong., 2d Sess. 59 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6848 [hereinafter Senate Report]. See generally Carl 
Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49 (1992) (describing the problems 
that arise when supervising the implementation of the CJRA). 
76. See Tobias, supra note 75, at 54; cf. Minutes of Telephone Conference of 9th Circuit 
Civil Justice Reform Act Review Committee I (Apr. 2, 1992) (ten of twelve committee members 
voting for procedural review). 
77. Of course, if circuit committees inconsistently resolve this or similar issues, they could 
increase balkanization. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
78. See, e.g., Seventh Circuit Review Committee, Review of CJRA Reports and Plans (Mar. 
1992); Tenth Circuit Review Committee, Review of CJRA Reports and Plans (Mar. 30, 1992). 
But cf. First Circuit Review Committee, Review of CJRA Reports and Plans (Mar. 1992) (applying 
an apparently rigorous review); Ninth Circuit Review Committee, Review of Civil Justice Reform 
Act Plans (Apr. 14, 1992) (same). See generally FEDERAL JUDICIAL· CENTER, GUIDELINES FOR 
REVIEW OF C.J.R.A. REPORTS AND PLANS (Jan. 1992). My assertions are premised almost exclusively 
on the documents that the committees prepared. · 
79. 28 U.S.C. § 474(a) (Supp. 1992). 
80. See, e.g., Letter from Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Circuit Executive, United States Court of 
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two EIDCs developed, "recommended approval to the judicial council 
based upon [his] review, and [compliance] was accomplished by mail 
at the end of December [1991]." 81 
b. Judicial Conference 
The Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and 
Case Management has not discharged its oversight responsibilities in 
ways that significantly reduce balkanization for numerous reasons sim-
ilar to those that apparently animated the circuit committees. 82 District 
judges have even greater influence in the Judicial Conference Committee 
because, for instance, no circuit judges sit on the subcommittee that 
has responsibility for conducting the initial review, and because district 
judges have vast experience with trial court litigation. 83 
Committee members may have had conflicts of interest somewhat 
analogous to the conflicts of individuals who serve on circuit commit-
tees. Chief Judge Robert Parker, who chairs the relevant subcommittee 
and is the Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, affords a 
pointed example. 84 Numerous observers assert that his district has 
adopted one of the most ambitious, and probably the most provocative, 
civil justice plans, but the plan also includes some provisions that are 
debatable as a matter of policy or authority and, therefore, could 
increase balkanization. 85 Some judges on the subcommittee might have 
found it awkward to suggest changes in that plan. Many subcommittee 
members correspondingly may have been unwilling to evaluate plans 
closely and to recommend changes that might interfere with what 
individual chief district judges consider preferable for their districts, as 
to which the chief judges possess superior knowledge, and from which 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to Carl Tobias (Mar. 25, 1992) (on file with author); Cohn 
Letter, supra note 74 (doubting that "Circuit Councils" have the resources to review plans). 
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 332 (Supp. 1992) with 28 U.S.C. § 474(a) (Supp. 1992). 
81. Letter from Steven Flanders, Circuit Executive, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, to Carl Tobias (Apr. 14, 1992) (on file with author). In fairness, the Judicial 
Conference had not issued its guidance when the review was undertaken. Congress, however, did 
seem to expect that chief circuit and district judges would train their expertise on the plans. 
82. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
83. The subcommittee includes five district judges and one magistrate judge. Telephone 
Interview with Donna Stienstra, Research Division, Federal Judicial Center (May 4, 1991). See 
also supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra note 69. 
85. See Cohn Letter, supra note 74 ("Ironically the plan of the Eastern District of Texas 
appears the boldest and the chair of the committee approving such plans is its chief judge."); E. 
DIST. OF TEX. PLAN, supra note 68; cf. infra notes 122-23, 145-46 and accompanying text. 
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numerous members are even farther removed than circuit committees. 86 
The CJRA and its legislative history provide equally general, and 
even less clear, guidance for Judicial Conference oversight. 87 For ex-
ample, section 474(b) states that the "Judicial Conference of the United 
States shall review each plan and report submitted ... and may request 
the district court to take additional action if [it] determines that such 
court has not adequately responded to the conditions relevant to the 
civil and criminal dockets of the court or to the recommendations of 
the district court's advisory group," while the accompanying legislative 
history does not elaborate. 88 
As with the circuit committees' instructions, neither the statutory 
phraseology nor the legislative history prescribes how rigorously the 
Judicial Conference should assess plans or expressly speaks to balkan-
ization, complexity, or disuniformity. 89 Congress also left unclear how 
the Conference should determine that a district has not "adequately 
responded to the conditions relevant to the civil and criminal dockets 
of the court or to the recommendations of the district's advisory 
group.' '90 Moreover, the statute provides significantly weaker authority 
for the Conference to propose modifications if it finds that a district's 
responses are insufficient, stating only that the Conference "may request 
the district court to take additional actions" without specifying those 
actions. 91 In light of this congressional authorization, the Conference 
may have experienced difficulty discerning precisely how Congress 
meant for it to evaluate the plans and could have been particularly 
uncertain about its ability to suggest changes in some plans.92 
The Conference Committee's national composition, responsibility, 
expertise, and perspective might have meant that it would have analyzed 
the plans closely and proposed that districts adopt measures which 
would reduce balkanization or at least recommended alterations in 
provisions that promised to exacerbate balkanization. Indeed, the Ju-
dicial Conference was uniquely situated to request that districts limit 
balkanization, because the Conference reviewed all of the plans prom-
86. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the circuit committee 
review process. 
87. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
88. 28 U.S.C. § 474(b) (Supp. 1992). See also Senate Report, supra note 75, at 50, 59, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6839, 6848. 
89. See supra text between text accompanying notes 74 and 75. 
90. 28 U.S.C. § 474(b). The Conference, therefore, must both understand local conditions 
and have a command of the advisory group's work. 
91. 28 U.S.C. § 474(b). 28 U.S.C. § 474(a) states that circuit committees shall make 
suggestions for actions they deem appropriate. 
92. Telephone Interview supra note 83; see also supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
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ulgated and could have afforded national resolution of critical issues, 
such as districts' authority to prescribe procedures that conflict with 
the Federal Rules.93 Nonetheless, the Judicial Conference requested that 
few EIDCs take additional actions which would substantially modify 
their plans.94 
c. Congress 
Congress also may be reluctant to perform its oversight responsibilities 
in ways that restrict balkanization. Congress assumes the same duty to 
oversee the CJRA as Congress has to monitor any substantive statute 
that it passes. Moreover, Congress has at least implicitly assumed more 
specific oversight responsibilities under CJRA by, for example, requiring 
that the Judicial Conference and the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts submit to it information on the Act's implementation.95 
Nevertheless, Congress seems unlikely to conduct rigorous oversight 
that would restrict balkanization. Congress has a "conflict of interest" 
because it has a substantial stake in the perceived success of the CJRA. 
After all, the CJRA was very controversial, the Judicial Conference 
opposed the legislation as introduced; and Congress passed the measure 
only after its principal sponsors agreed to make important aspects of 
the Act voluntary, namely the eleven principles, guidelines, and tech-
niques.96 Were Congress to demand substantial changes in the plans 
aimed at curbing balkanization, that response might be considered an 
admission that it had improperly conceptualized the statute. Corre-
spondingly, Congress may not want to review the plans vigorously or 
to require major modifications in them, because it must maintain 
relatively cordial relations with the federal judiciary, whose cooperation 
is essential to the success of CJRA and to other interbranch efforts, 
particularly efficacious court rulemaking. 97 
93. Telephone Interview, supra note 83 (reviewing all plans); see also supra note 77. 
94. See, e.g., Letter from Robert M. Parker, Chair, Judicial Conference of the United States 
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, to Edward J. Lodge, Chief Judge, 
United States District Court for the District of Idaho (July 30, 1992) (on file with author); Letter 
from Robert M. Parker, Chair, Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on Court 
Administration and Case Management, to John F. Gerry, Chief Judge, United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey (July 30, 1992) (on file with author); cf. Memorandum from 
Robert M. Parker, Chairman, Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Court 
Administration and Case Management, to Chief Judges, United States Courts of Appeals et al. 
(Oct. 22, 1992) (explaining the Conference's action with respect to limitations on contingency 
fees). 
95. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 103(c)(3)-(4), 104(d), 105(c), 
104 Stat. 5089, 5096-98. 
96. Senate Report, supra note 75, at 4-5, 29-31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6806-07, 
6832-34. 
97. See id. at 4-5, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6806-07; supra notes 50-55 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 103, 173 and accompanying text. 
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Congress may also def er to the judgment of the individual chief 
district judges who adopted the plans, for reasons similar to those that 
apparently motivated the circuit committees, 98 and to the determinations 
of the oversight entities that Congress created. 99 For example, Congress 
will be less familiar with conditions in the local districts than the chief 
district judges who formulated the plans and less familiar than most 
members of the circuit committees and of the Judicial Conference 
Committee which reviewed the plans. 100 
Moreover, congressional treatment in the CJRA of several issues, 
and its failure to address certain others, suggest that Congress will be 
reluctant to scrutinize implementation and to institute measures which 
would curtail balkanization. Congress did not expressly provide for its 
own oversight and afforded only highly generalized guidance for other 
reviewing entities. For instance, the Act obliquely states that the "Ju-
dicial Conference shall prepare a report on the plans developed and 
implemented by the Early Implementation District Courts" for Congress 
by June l, 1992. 101 Concomitant congressional failure to mention spe-
cifically the crucial problem of potential conflicts between local pro-
cedures and the Federal Rules illustrates its lack of concern about 
balkanization. 102 Congress deliberately structured the statute so that the 
ninety-four districts can implement local procedures that are not subject 
to the national rule revision process, which permits Congress to maintain 
consistency. 103 
Furthermore, Congress is too busy discharging a plethora of other 
responsibilities, ranging from balancing the budget to debating the war 
powers. An important duty that has led many' federal judges, most 
notably Chief Justice Rehnquist, to question congressional resolve re-
garding civil justice reform is the serious consideration that Congress 
98. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the circuit committees' 
apparent motivations. 
99. After all, Congress did create these entities, ostensibly because they possessed relevant 
expertise. 
100. See supra notes 70-74, 82-83 and accompanying text. 
101. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § l03(c)(3); see also 
Judicial Conference of the United States, Civil Justice Reform Act Report, Development and 
Implementation of Plans by Early Implementation Districts and Pilot Courts (June l, 1992). 
102. In fairness, Congress may have believed that the Judicial Improvements Act of 1988 and 
the efforts of the Local Rules Project had adequately responded to the problems of inconsistency. 
Supra notes 28-50 and accompanying text; infra notes 103, 118-28 and accompanying text. 
103. The Rules Enabling Act affords Congress seven months to analyze and act upon proposals 
to amend the Federal Rules that the Supreme Court submits to it. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (Supp. 1992); 
see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. R£v. 1015 passim 
(1982) (discussing the history and evolution of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934); supra note 102. 
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has ac~orded to new substantive legislation, such as the Violent Crime 
Control Act and the Violence Against Women Act. 104 The judges believe 
that this legislation's passage would severely hamper their effdrts to 
achieve the CJRA's goals. In the final analysis, Congress simply may 
be more concerned about a host of additional matters, including the 
reduction of expense and delay in civil litigation, than the increased 
balkanization that the CJRA's implementation could effect. 
B. Evaluation of the CJRA and its Implementation 
This subsection considers in greater detail how Congress deliberately 
or inadvertently drafted the CJRA, and how the thirty-four EIDCs 
have implemented the Act, in certain ways that have promoted, and 
will foster, balkanization. The potential for increasing disuniformity 
and complexity are manifested theoretically in the statute's language 
and accompanying legislative history and are evidenced practically in 
the districts' implementation of the CJRA. 
1. Placing Responsibility in the Ninety-Four Districts 
Important congressional choices, alluded to above, involved the branch 
and level of the federal government at which it lodged nearly exclusive 
responsibility for the CJRA's implementation and the time frames 
prescribed for compliance. 105 Placing practically complete responsibility 
for effectuating the CJRA at the local level in the ninety-four districts 
that comprise the civil justice system with comparatively similar tem-
poral requirements inherently enhances balkanization. 
A critical factor has been, and will be, the sheer number of federal 
districts, many of which have different needs, geography, populations, 
available physical space, and legal cultures. Moreover, Congress in-
structed the districts to appoint all of the advisory groups by the same 
early date, ninety days after the CJRA's passage. 106 Although thirty-
four courts adopted plans by December 31, 1991 to qualify for EIDC 
designation, many of the remaining sixty districts attempted to issue 
plans by the end of 1992. 107 A number of the groups and districts, 
104. See The Chief on the Judiciary: Less is More, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 6, 1992, at 6, 7 
(expressing concerns about two bills in year-end report on federal judiciary); S. 1241, 102nd 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Violent Crime Control Act); S. 15, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Violence 
Against Women Act). 
105. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text. 
106. 28 U.S.C. § 478(a) (Supp. 1992). Congress passed the Act on December 1, 1990. 
107. Telephone Interviews with Abel Mattos, Court Administration Division, Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts (Sept. 4, 1.992); Donna Stienstra, Research Division, Federal Judicial 
Center (Feb. 13, 1992); cf. U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE w. DIST. OF Mo., CML JUSTICE EXPENSE 
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Apr. 30, 1992) (only court adopting plan in 1992). 
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therefore, were essentially working simultaneously. This sharply con-
stricted the opportunities for interdistrict consultation about the CJRA's 
implementation and specific procedures. It also reduced the time for 
instituting, experimenting with, and evaluating, procedures which EIDCs 
adopted and concomitantly restricted the possibility that plans developed 
earlier would inform and improve the efforts of districts working 
subsequently. 108 
Furthermore, the CJRA assigns all ninety-four districts numerous 
tasks. Perhaps most important, each district must consider, and may 
adopt, eleven principles, guidelines, and techniques and any other 
procedures which they deem appropriate under the sixth, open-ended 
technique, while the districts can select diverse means for effectuating 
the procedures that they choose. 109 Congress so provided, rather than, 
for example, circumscribing the number of districts which could pre-
scribe such a broad panoply of procedures or limiting those procedures 
that every one of the districts might adopt. These factors intrinsically 
have fostered, and will promote, balkanization. Quite a few districts 
have inserted in their plans, and many others will select, numerous 
procedures that vary substantially from district to district and among 
cases. Correspondingly, the imposition of a greater number of proce-
dures, some of which are more complex-requiring that attorneys and 
parties prepare, file, and sign more documents and participate in 
additional activities, especially litigation conferences, thereby introduc-
ing more points of contention-has complicated the litigation process 
for, and consumed valuable resources of, judges, lawyers, and parties. 
2. Congressional Guidance in the CJRA's First Three Sections 
Congress included additional specific guidance in the first three 
sections of the CJRA which contributes to balkanization. Advisory 
groups and districts have applied instructions from each section in ways 
that are internally inconsistent and that conflict with guidance in the 
other two sections and with external strictures, such as those in the 
Federal Rules and the United States Code. One of the provisions, 
section 472, affords instructions for advisory groups in compiling 
108. For example, once districts adopt plans, they must conduct annual assessments of their 
dockets "with a view to determining appropriate additional actions ... to reduce cost and delay 
in civil litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 475 (Supp. 1992). This means that relatively few districts which 
might have intended to adopt plans by the end of 1992 would have had the benefit of annual 
assessments that EIDCs perform. 
109. 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. 1992); see also infra notes 129-53 and accompanying text. 
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report8 and recommendations. 110 The others are section 471, which 
prescribes the purposes of plans, and section '473, which enumerates 
. specific principles, guidelines, and techniques that courts must consider 
and may include in those plans. 111 
a. Internal Inconsistency 
Certain guidance in section 4 72 ilh1strates how the three provlSlons 
can be internally inconsistent. In that section, Congress instructed the 
advisory groups to posit recommendations for districts that would 
"reduce cost and delay and thereby facilitat [ e] access to the courts." 112 
Expedited disposition may not necessarily be the best resolution, espe-
cially for litigants who possess comparatively limited resources and 
information, such as numerous civil rights plaintiffs. These parties 
typically need more, not less, time to conduct discovery, so that the 
litigants can collect, analyze and synthesize the requisite material to 
make their cases. This means that Congress required the advisory groups 
to formulate recommendations which would satisfy the statutory re-
quirement of reducing delay, but frustrate, and even def eat, the equally 
important requirement of facilitating court access, which appears three 
words away in the same clause of section 472. 113 Nearly all of the 
groups and districts have apparently ignored this conflict, as witnessed 
in the groups' proposals and the courts' adoption of numerous proce-
dures that would simultaneously decrease delay and impede access. For 
instance, quite a few of the EID Cs have imposed numerical restrictions 
on discovery, that will reduce delay and restrict access. 114 
b. Conflicts Among the Three Sections 
Examples in the paragraph above also demonstrate how the three 
sections conflict with one another. 115 The requirement in section 472 
that advisory group recommendations decrease delay can contradict the 
110. 28 U.S.C. § 472 (Supp. 1992). 
Ill. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 473 (Supp. 1992). These three sections are among the most important 
to the implementation of the CJRA. 
112. 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(3) (Supp. 1992). For the ideas regarding resource discrepancies among 
litigants in this paragraph, and in the remainder of this paper, I rely substantially on Carl Tobias, 
Rule ll and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 495-508 (1988-89). 
113. See supra text accompanying note 112. Section 471 includes similar internal inconsistencies. 
For example, the "purposes of each plan are to ... ensure just [and] speedy ... resolutions of 
civil disputes." 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 1992). 
114. E.g., IDAHO PLAN, supra note 65, at 11 (limits on interrogatories and depositions); MASS. 
PLAN, supra note 68, at 35 (same). 
115. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
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statement in section 471 that one purpose of plans is to "ensure just 
... resolutions of civil disputes. " 116 Moreover, the eleven principles, 
guidelines, and techniques that section 473 states courts must consider 
and may adopt could conflict with the requirements of section 472 and 
the purposes of section 471. For instance, vigorous implementation of 
the sixth guideline-authorizing the referral of appropriate cases to 
ADR programs-can frustrate and pervert section 472's requirement to 
facilitate court access and section 471 's purpose to facilitate "deliberate 
adjudication of civil cases on the merits." 117 
c. Conflicts with External Requirements 
Moreover, the three CJRA sections afford considerable guidance, 
which when implemented can conflict with external requirements. Con-
gress implicitly, and perhaps expressly, empowered advisory groups to 
suggest, and districts to adopt, procedures that contravene provisions 
in the Federal Rules and the United States Code. 118 None of the three 
sections explicitly prohibits, and each by implication permits, such 
inconsistency; indeed, nothing in the CJRA or its legislative history 
appears to proscribe expressly these conflicts. More specifically, section 
473 provides that districts shall consider, and may adopt, eleven prin-
ciples, guidelines, and techniques. Certain of these prescribed proce-
dures, such as several principles and guidelines pertaining to discovery, 
which quite a few districts have implemented, contravene existing Fed-
eral Rules governing discovery. 119 Correspondingly, the open-ended pro-
vision in the sixth technique of section 473(b) implicitly invites districts 
to adopt procedures that conflict with exogenous requirements. 120 How 
116. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(3) (Supp. 1992) with 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 1992). See 
also supra note 113 and accompanying text. · 
117. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (Supp. 1992) with 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(3) (Supp. 1992) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 1992). See also infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. 
118. The Rules Enabling Act states that local rules must be "consistent with Acts of Congress" 
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (Supp. 1990); see also supra notes 
35-37, 53-54; infra notes 128, 140-51 and accompanying text. 
119. Perhaps the most controversial and most troubling examples involve mandatory pre-
discovery disclosure, some of which would radically transform traditional notions of discovery. 
See, e.g., IDAHO PLAN, supra note 65, at 10-11; E. DIST. N.Y. PLAN, supra note 36, at 4-5. The 
Civil Rules Committee, which proposed a similar revision in federal discovery provisions during 
1991, has already dramatically reversed course twice on the issue. See 1991 Preliminary Draft, 
supra note 51, at 87-88 (proposing amendments to rules 16 and 26); Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil 
Procedure Revisited, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1992, at I, 12. See also supra note 52. 
120. Each district "shall consider and may include ... such .other features as [it] consider(s] 
appropriate after considering the recommendations of the advisory group." 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6) 
(Supp. 1990). The examples immediately below overlap with similar ones that districts apparently 
adopted pursuant to the sixth technique. See infra notes 140-51 and accompanying text. 
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numernus districts in fact implemented the CJRA makes less significant 
precisely what Congress intended regarding consistency .121 
A number of advisory groups have recommended that courts adopt, 
and numerous districts have proceeded as if they have authority to 
prescribe, procedures that contravene the Federal Rules or the United 
States Code. The baldest assertion of authority appears in the pl~n for 
the Eastern District of Texas, which proclaims that "to the extent that 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent with this Plan, 
the Plan has precedence and is controlling. " 122 The court, apparently 
attempting to demonstrate that it could exercise that power, included 
an off er of judgment provision which seems inconsistent wit}l Federal 
Rule 68. 123 Additional EIDCs have implemented procedures that clearly 
or apparently contravene the Federal Rules or the United States Code, 
although few have been so direct as the Eastern District of Texas. For 
example, the Montana District is assigning civil cases co-equally to 
Article III judges and magistrate judges. 124 The court will notify litigants 
whose cases are assigned to magistrate judges that they may request 
reassignment to an Article III judge; however, if parties do not file 
timely requests, the right will be deemed waived.'" Placing the onus 
on litigants in this way, rather than proceeding only with their affir-
mative consent, seems inconsistent with the provision for ref erring cases 
to magistrate judges in section 636(c)(2) of Title 28 of the United States 
Code. 126 
Numerous courts have asserted that they possess rather broad au-
thority to prescribe procedural provisions that conflict with the Federal 
Rules or the United States Code. 127 The districts have so acted, even 
though the General Counsel of the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts, which has substantial responsibility for implementing the 
CJRA, has circulated to all of the courts a memorandum stating that 
121. I am not saying that what districts actually did makes it correct; indeed, I find the 
activity problematic. It is difficult to imagine that Congress accorded the issue no consideration. 
For instance, when it instructed three demonstration districts to "experiment with various methods 
of reducing cost and delay in civil litigation, including alternative dispute resolution," Congress 
must have contemplated that the districts might make ADR mandatory and even enforce the 
requirement with sanctions. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. 
122. E. DIST. TEX. PLAN, supra note 68, at 9. 
123. Compare E. DIST. OF TEX. PLAN, supra note 68, at 10 with FED. R. Crv. P. 68. See also 
supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text, infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. See generally 
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (discussing Rule 68). 
124. MONT. PLAN, supra note 39, at 3-4; see also Tobias, supra note 39, at 93 n.9. 
125. MoNT. PLAN, supra note 39, at 3-4; see also Tobias, supra note 39, at 93 n.9. 
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (Supp. 1990); Tobias, supra note 39, at 93 n.9. 
127. See, e.g., infra notes 140-51 and accompanying text. 
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the Act grants them much narrower authority to adopt inconsistent 
procedures. 128 
3. A Closer Look at the CJRA's Principles, Guidelines, and 
Techniques 
Congress afforded considerable, unclear guidance that has enhanced, 
and will increase, balkanization. The eleven principles, guidelines, and 
techniques of litigation management and cost and delay reduction that 
districts must take into account,. and may adopt, have been, and will 
be, so conducive to balkanization that they warrant more detailed 
treatment here. The large number of principles, guidelines, and tech-
niques, most having multiple subparts, inherently enhance balkanization 
because the districts will select varying permutations and conibinations 
of the procedures that Congress provided, thereby contributing to 
complexity and disuniformity. Congress, however, apparently attempted 
to retain some uniformity, and perhaps limit complexity, by stating 
that all districts are to consider, and may adopt, the identical eleven 
procedures. 
In addition to this general propensity of the eleven principles, guide-
lines, and techniques to incre~se balkanization, nearly all of the specific 
procedures enhance disuniformity. Most of the six principles and guide-
lines foster intercase disuniformity. The first, prescribing differential 
judicial management tailored to case complexity, anci the third, calling 
for careful, deliberate judicial monitoring of discovery in complex 
lawsuits, inherently promote intercase disuniformity .129 Numerous EIDCs 
have used tracks, which contemplate that judicial officers will closely 
manage complex cases, especially during discovery, and minimally man-
128. See Memorandum from William R. Burchill, Jr., General Counsel, Administrative Office 
of the U.S. Courts, to Abel J. Mattos, Court Administration Division, Administrative Office of 
U. S. Courts (July 5, 1991) (regarding the impact of the Civil Justice Reform Act on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and arbitration statutes) (on file with author). See generally Linda S. 
Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 375 (1992). 
A related, but less important, issue for which Congress did not clearly provide is whether the 
plans are self-executing or whether they only can be implemented through existing, revised, or 
new local rules. Most of the thirty-four districts seeking EIDC status have relied on current, or 
proposed amended, or new, local rules. Nevertheless, some districts have proceeded as if procedural 
provisions in their plans can be directly enforced against lawyers and litigants. The plan for the 
Eastern District of New York affords an analogous, but even more troubling, exam6le. The Plan 
states that the advisory group's report "constitutes the 'legislative history' of the Plan and shall 
serve as a guide in its implementation and interpretation." E. DIST. N.Y. PLAN, supra note 36, 
at 1. This assumes that all federal court practitioners have copies of the report, although that 
document comprises 147 pages and few copies were printed initially. 
129. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(l), (3) (Supp. 1992). 
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age relatively simple, routine litigation. 130 Indeed, a number of districts 
have required or suggested that magistrate judges or alternative dispute 
resolution processes be employed when resolving less complicated liti-
gation.131 This implicates the sixth principle, "authorization to refer 
appropriate cases" to ADR programs that have been designated for 
use in districts or which the courts may provide. 132 In short, according 
lawsuits differential treatment, essentially premised on their complexity, 
intrinsically promotes intercase disuniformity. 133 
Numerous principles, guidelines, and techniques also increase com-
plexity. Practically all of the techniques and most of the principles and 
guidelines complicate civil litigation by, for example, imposing greater 
responsibilities on judges, lawyers, and litigants. The initial two tech-
niques' requirements-that counsel prepare discovery-case management 
plans and attend pretrial conferences with authority to bind clients on 
matters that the court identifies-enhance complexity. 134 Additional 
complication similarly attends the fifth technique's command' that rep-
resentatives of litigants who can bind the parties attend settlement 
conf erences135 and the suggestions in the fourth technique and the sixth 
principle that litigants participate in various forms of ADR. 136 The third 
technique's signature requirement and the fifth guideline's certification 
stricture concomitantly enhance complexity. 137 
Examples in the two paragraphs immediately above illustrate that the 
closer judicial management, especially of pretrial procedures and dis-
covery, which the principles, guidelines, and techniques contemplate, 
130. E.g., U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE S. DIST. OF FLA., CJvn. JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN 102-06 (Nov. 1991); U.S. DIST. CT. s. DIST. ILL., CIVIL JUSTICE DELAY AND 
EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN 2-4 (Dec. 27, 1991); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
131. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF OR., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN 9-17 (Dec. 30, 1991); U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE s. DIST. OF w.v., CIVIL JUSTICE 
DELAY AND EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN 81-89 (Dec. 30, 1991) [hereinafter s. DIST. w.v. PLAN]. 
132. 28 U.S.C. § 473 (a)(6) (Supp. 1990). 
133. Any time multiple districts adopt disparate principles, guidelines, or techniques they will 
increase interdistrict disunifonnity. See supra text in the paragraph immediately preceding the text 
accompanying this note. 
134. See 28 u.s.c. § 473(b)(l), (2) (Supp. 1992); U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE s. DIST. OF IND., 
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 3-9 (Dec. 31, 1991) [hereinafter s. DIST. 
IND. PLAN]; MONT. PLAN, supra note 39, at 10. 
135. See 28 u.s.c. § 473(b)(5) (Supp. 1992); U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF KAN., CIVIL 
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 9-10 (Dec. 31, 1991); MASS. PLAN, supra note 68, 
at 54. 
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6), (b)(4) (Supp. 1992); supra notes 131-32 and accompanying 
text. 
137. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(5), (b)(3) (Supp. 1992); S. DIST. OF IND. PLAN, supra note 134, 
at 13; WYO. PLAN, supra note 36, at 13. 
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may compound complexity in somewhat subtler ways. The central 
function assigned to judges' participation in the pretrial process, by 
overemphasizing factual and legal specifics before trial, might make 
pretrial conferences the modern equivalent of technical pleading. 138 The 
principles, guidelines, and techniques could introduce additional com-
plication by multiplying the number of steps in particular cases, 139 and 
the procedures promise to enhance the complexity of discovery by· 
increasing judicial control of it and by imposing greater, earlier discov-
ery responsibilities on counsel. 
The sixth technique's open-ended provision for courts to adopt "such 
other features" as districts find "appropriate after considering" their 
advisory groups' recommendations apparently has been an important 
source of complexity and disuniformity. 140 Numerous EIDCs, more by 
implication than explicitly, may have relied on this technique to pre-
scribe many procedures that the CJRA does not specifically authorize. 141 
A number of these procedures seem debatable as a matter of authority 
or policy, and they increase balkanization. 
Provisions in quite a few civil justice plans are illustrative. The 
Eastern District of Texas has imposed a "maximum fee schedule for 
contingency fee cases" that are not governed by congressional fee-
shifting provisions, such as civil rights cases. 142 The district is imple-
menting this schedule, although the Supreme Court has recently and 
clearly proclaimed that "allocation of the costs accruing from litigation 
is a matter for the legislature, not the courts. " 143 
The Western District of Missouri is sending one-third of its civil suits 
automatically to a mandatory, non-binding program of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) and will sanction litigants who fail to par-
ticipate in good faith in ADR. 144 This requirement could seriously 
disadvantage parties with scarce resources. It demands that the litigants 
spend their time, money, and effort on preparing to participate in 
138. See Subrin, supra note 5, at 1649; supra note 24 and accompanying text; cf. Tobias, 
supra note 24, at 942-46 (suggesting that Rule 16 is overused, especially to sanction). 
139. See Subrin, supra note 5, at 1649-50; supra notes 24, 134-37 and accompanying text. 
140. 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6) (Supp. 1992). 
141. Because very few districts have expressly so stated, I am assuming that they relied. on 
the sixth technique. The examples below overlap with, but are broader than, those offered above 
to illustrate conflicts with the Federal Rules or the United States Code. See supra notes 118-28 
and accompanying text. 
142. E. DIST. TEX. PLAN, supra note 68, at 7-8. 
143. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990); see also 
Chambers v. Nasco, Ill S. Ct. 2123, 2141-42 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
144. U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE W. DIST. OF Mo., EARLY AssESSMENT PROGRAM, EARLY IMPLE-
MENTATION PROJECT 1-15 (Oct. 31, 1991). See generally Tobias, supra note 75, at SO .n.5, 52. 
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reach agreement before counsel file discovery motions. 152 A number of 
districts correspondingly require that courts set early, firm trial dates, 
that opponents confer prior to submitting discovery requests, and that 
individuals with binding authority attend settlement conferences. 153 
In sum, Congress structured the CJRA in ways that inherently 
increase balkanization. Most importantly, Congress placed primary 
responsibility for implementing the Act in all ninety-four districts and 
stated that each must consider, and might adopt, a plethora of prin-
ciples, guidelines, and techniques. The EIDCs, for their part, selectively 
prescribed different combinations of the statutorily-enumerated proce-
dures, thereby fostering greater disuniformity and complexity. The third 
section analyzes the consequences of enhanced balkanization. 
Ill. IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED BALKANIZATION 
This piece has expressly or implicitly mentioned numerous conse-
quences of increased balkanization, as most recently, and perhaps most 
significantly, manifested in civil justice reform. Nonetheless, those 
implications are so important that they warrant explicit examination at 
this juncture. Enhanced balkanization, as witnessed more specifically 
in greater complexity and disuniformity, detrimentally affects partici-
pants in federal civil litigation, institutions associated with the federal 
courts, and the broader society. 
Increased complexity is evidenced by the growing number of proce-
dures, many of which have become more complicated, impose onerous 
obligations, or are obscure or otherwise difficult to find. This com-
plexity has deleterious ramifications for all judges, lawyers, and liti-
gants, but especially for counsel and parties with limited resources. 154 
Attorneys and litigants who possess less money, time, and information 
experience significant difficulty discovering and mastering, much less 
fully complying with, more numerous and more complex procedures, 
such as the ever-expanding number of steps in civil lawsuits. 155 The new 
requirements for drafting, filing, and signing papers, for attending 
conferences, and for discharging additional, burdensome obligations 
152. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CJRA PLAN COMPARISON (Feb. 27, 1992) [hereinafter 
CJRA PLAN COMPARISON); supra notes 131-32, 134, 137 and accompanying text. 
153. See CJRA PLAN COMPARISON, supra note 152; supra notes 135-37 and accompanying 
text. The survey in this paragraph considers all of the EIDCs. Many of the procedures mentioned 
here, accordingly, complement those examined more specifically above. 
154. See supra note 112. 
155. See, e.g., supra notes 134-35, 139 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the 
difficulties imposed upon civil rights litigants by Rule 11, see Tobias, supra note 112, at 495-98. 
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ADR, the results of which will not be binding. The parties must 
participate on pain of being sanctioned, which could further deplete 
their resources. 145 Additional districts have issued plans which expressly 
or implicitly state that sanctions might be imposed for failure to comply 
with prescribed procedures, although the CJRA does not specifically 
mention sanctions. 146 Indeed, the plan developed in the Massachusetts 
District characterizes negligent violations of its provisions as conduct 
punishable with sanctions. 147 
The Montana District is establishing a peer review committee, com-
posed of federal court practitioners "appointed by majority vote of the 
article III Judges of the district in active service," which will review 
the litigation conduct and discovery practices of lawyers who practice 
in the court. 148 The committee will analyze litigation behavior or dis-
covery practices at the request of any judicial officer, who will provide 
it with a statement describing the questionable activity .149 The commit-
tee, after considering the record, must "present the judicial officer with 
an advisory opinion stating whether the practice or conduct falls within 
the bounds of accepted discovery or litigation practice." 150 The Montana 
District affords few procedural prescriptions, particularly in terms of 
due process. For example, it makes no provision for oral testimony or 
the right to challenge allegations in the paper record. Although courts 
certainly possess broad authority to appoint special masters or other 
adjuncts who will assist the court, the CJRA does not expressly provide 
for entities like the peer review committees. 151 
A survey of the thirty-four EIDCs shows that nearly all of them 
have subscribed to most of these principles, guidelines, and techniques. 
Practically every district has prescribed early, ongoing judicial manage-
ment, ADR participation, and certification of good faith efforts to 
145. The Western District of Missouri also may lack the requisite authority to impose the 
ADR requirement, _although congressional designation of the court as a demonstration district 
that must experiment with ADR may suffice. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-650, § 104(b)(2), 104 Stat. 5089, 5097 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.); Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 
lowA L. REv. 889, 947-51 (1991); Tobias, supra note 75, at 52 n.17; supra notes 118-28 and 
accompanying text. 
146. E.g., Report and Plan of the Advisory Group of the District Court of the Virgin Islands, 
at 35 (Dec. 23, 1991); S. DIST. W.V. PLAN, supra note 131, at 90 (Dec. 30, 1991); see also E. 
D1sT. N.Y. PLAN, supra note 36, at 18. 
147. See MASS. PLAN, supra note 68, at 67. 
148. MONT. PLAN, supra note 39, at 17; see also Tobias, supra note 46, at 449. 
149. See MONT. PLAN, supra note 39, at 17. 
150. Id. 
151. See Tobias, supra note 39, at 95 n.23. 
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that the CJRA's implementation effects-particularly as they elaborate 
the already substantial demands, such as those which Rules 11 and 16 
impose-similarly disadvantage these lawyers and parties. 1s6 Enhanced 
complexity also adversely affects the federal courts. For example, 
judges' responsibilities to preside over a larger number, and greater 
variety, of litigation conferences, many of which are more complex, 
consume increasingly scarce judicial resources. 157 
Enhanced disuniformity could have certain, closely related implica-
tions. Greater interdistrict disuniformity is seen in increasingly disparate 
local rules governing the pretrial process and in growing inconsistencies 
between many local rules that encompass numerous procedural matters 
and the Federal Rules. 158 This interdistrict disuniformity, which is 
compounded by the plethora of additional principles, guidelines, and 
techniques that civil justice reform provides, complicates the efforts of 
lawyers with national practices, such as federal government attorneys, 
to participate in lawsuits in districts that follow procedures with which 
they are not completely familiar .1s9 These problems will afflict everyone 
who litigates in multiple districts, but will be acute for public interest 
litigants, such as the Sierra Club and the NAACP, and public interest 
lawyers. For example, resource deficiencies make it difficult ~or the 
public interest groups and attorneys to learn about, command, and 
conform to the procedures. Enhanced intercase disuniformity is wit-
nessed by limitations imposed on certain parties' procedural possibilities, 
such as numerical restrictions on interrogatories or depositions, and by 
requirements that mandate or encourage participation in ADR or set-
tlement conferences. 160 For instance, individuals who lack resources and 
information need greater, rather than less, discovery, so that they can 
secure sufficient data to prove their cases, while participation in ADR 
can additionally deplete the few resources these litigants may possess. 161 
Increasingly balkanized procedure is not neutral. Procedural choices 
that enhance complexity and disuniformity can foster particular values 
156. See, e.g., supra notes 23-25, 134-37 and accompanying text. 
157. See, e.g., supra notes 18-19, 134-35 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 15, 104 
and accompanying text (discussing scarcity of judicial resources and the expl!)sion of litigation). 
158. See, e.g., supra notes 18-21, 119 and accompanying text. 
159. At least government counsel usually can rely on local United States Attorneys who will 
be familiar with local practice. Large, private law firms with multi-district practices typically will 
have more resources to master the procedures than others involved in federal court litigation. See 
Coquillette et al., supra note 31, at 65. 
160. See, e.g., supra notes 114, 129-32, 136 and accompanying text. These restrictions and 
requirements may apply to all cases. Even when they do, the limitations and requirements 
disproportionately disadvantage lawyers and litigants with fewer resources. 
161. See, e.g., supra notes 112-14, 144-45 and accompanying text. 
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and serve specific interests. 162 Accumulating evidence suggests that many 
practitioners and their clients, especially those with significant resources 
and information, have increasingly capitalized on numerous tactical 
advantages that growing balkanization affords. 
On a general level, lawyers and parties who have greater resources 
can invest their time, money, and effort finding, integrating, and 
invoking increasingly complex and disuniform procedures. A recent, 
exhaustive study in the specific context of employment discrimination 
litigation shows that defense counsel and defendants have employed a 
number of strategic benefits that enhanced balkanization makes possible 
to frustrate plaintiffs' vindication of constitutional rights and statuto-
rily-prescribed interests. 163 The study also indicates that numerous judges 
have become more receptive to defendants' assertion of the procedural 
requirements, other judges have invoked the procedural strictures, and 
a few judges have even -vigorously enforced them, thereby evincing 
decreased solicitude for the needs of the plaintiffs. 164 These practices 
have had detrimental impacts on resource-poor attorneys and litigants. 
For instance, even when the lawyers and parties were able to master 
and comply with onerous procedures and could def eat procedural 
· technicalities that their opponents or judges asserted, the attorneys and 
litigants have increasingly found that contracting procedural opportu-
nities frustrate and preclude their pursuit of substantive rights1165 
The newest indicium of these developments in procedure is the 
deployment for perceived tactical gain of procedures instituted under 
the CJRA. A clear example that already enjoys widespread use is the 
request for mandatory pre-discovery disclosure. 166 Counsel and parties 
have sought disclosure, even when plaintiffs had commenced suit long 
before EIDCs made disclosure requirements effective, and although 
most of the requirements conflict with applicable discovery provisions 
in the Federal Rules. 167 
Many of the lawyers and litigants, such as civil rights attorneys and 
plaintiffs, whom increased balkanization disadvantages the most, are 
162. See Subrin, supra note 5, at 1651; Tobias, supra note 2, at 336-39. See generally Stephen 
B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1463 (1987) (book review). 
163. See generally Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: 
The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REv. 331 
(1992). 
164. Cf. Tobias, supra note 2, at 296-335 (similar conclusions regarding judicial application 
of Federal Rules). See generally Baumann et al., supra note 163. 
165. See, e.g., supra notes 20-21, 114, 129-32, 136 and accompanying text. 
166. The material in this paragraph is premised on conversations with numerous attorneys in 
a number of locales and on letters from, and conversations with, some judges. 
167. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
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precisely the practitioners and parties Congress intended to vindicate 
constitutional rights and statutory interests in federal civil litigation. 168 
Numerous potential litigants and actual parties whom enhanced bal-
kanization will similarly affect are those individuals whose court access 
Congress avowedly meant to facilitate when it enacted the CJRA. In 
all of these statutes, but especially the social legislation, , Congress 
intended that the federal judiciary be solicitous of persons for whose 
benefit Congress passed the measures. 
These factors in turn implicate certain important institutional con-
sequences of increased balkanization. 169 Congress has enacted more than 
forty statutes that grant substantive rights or interests and procedural 
advantages to their intended beneficiaries, such as individuals entitled 
to social security, whose vindication of rights and interests Congress 
wanted judges to encourage. 170 When heightened procedural complexity 
or disuniformity, reflected in local rules' requirements that are stricter 
than the Federal Rules or that conflict with the substantive legislation, 
complicates the potential litigants' pursuit of those rights and interests, 
several deleterious effects can arise. 171 The increased complexity and 
disuniformity may foreclose intended beneficiaries' vindication of their 
rights, such as the pursuit, and possible recovery, of social security 
payments to which they might be legally entitled. They may also 
frustrate Congress' intent-such as reducing discrimination-in passing 
the substantive statutes. Judicial power concomitantly expands at the 
expense of Congress and of the parties who Congress intended would 
vindicate the constitutional rights and substantive statutory interests. 
These developments could additionally strain already fragile relations 
between the legislative and judicial branches, especially in such impor-
tant areas as national rule revision, and may even provoke a constitu-
tional confrontation .172 
168. Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N .C.L. REv. 
745, 756-57 (1987); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 
COLUM. L. REv. 1432 (1988) (intended beneficiaries); Tobias, supra note 2, at 284-85 (same). 
169. In this paragraph, I rely substantially on Tobias, supra note 2; Tobias, supra note 112. 
See also Baumann et al., supra note 163. 
170. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988) (Supp. 1990)) (recent example); see also 
ROBERT E. LITAN & Wn.UAM D. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 44 (1983); Tobias, 
supra note 168, at 756-57; Tobias, supra note 2, at 284-85. 
171. See, e.g., supra notes 35, 119, 123 and accompanying text. The problem is acute when 
the courts adopt local rules that undercut procedural advantages that Congress deliberately inserted 
in substantive statutes. See Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Legislation, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 
801 passim (1992). 
172. For example, Congress has adopted a plethora of civil rights restoration acts, which 
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Enhanced balkanization might correspondingly have detrimental im-
plications for the venerated institution of national court rulemaking by 
indirectly diminishing its influence and even undermining its relevance. 
Greater balkanization, particularly as manifested in the increased lo-
calization of federal civil procedure, could foster a procedural system 
that is pr,emised on less expertise and is more parochial. As that system 
becomes increasingly local and disuniform, there may even be less 
perceived need for national rule revision. It would be unfortunate, 
however, to lose the experience and the system-wide perspective on the 
rule-amendment process of the Civil Rules Committee, the Supreme 
Court, and Congress. 173 This expertise and viewpoint have served the 
federal courts exceedingly well for over a half-century, especially by 
sustaining a uniform, simple procedure and, concomitantly, minimizing 
balkanization. 
Growing balkanization adversely affects the civil justice system. For 
example, the earlier procedural developments, such as managerial judg-
ing, as elaborated by the CJRA's implementation, require that attorneys 
and parties prepare, file, and sign a greater number of papers and 
attend more conferences, multiply the steps in lawsuits, and enhance 
the emphasis on ADR. Most importantly, these considerations make it 
more difficult to ascertain the truth and to reach the merits of disputes, 
diminishing the quality of justice secured. 174 The factors correspondingly 
enhance delay in civil litigation and enlarge its costs. The consummate 
irony of civil justice reform is that the increased balkanization mani-
fested in CJRA's implementation probably will have effects very dif-
ferent from those that Congress intended: it may well lead to greater 
delay and expense in civil litigation, decreased federal court access, 
fewer fair resolutions and fewer merits-based dispositions. 175 Indeed, as 
early as April, 1992, one district judge aptly epitomized the implications 
for the civil justice system of the CJRA's implementation and then 
mentioned a deleterious, systemic consequence: "Importantly, if idio-
syncratic approaches to procedure [are] the order of the day we are in 
culminated in the divisive passage of Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See Tobias, supra note 24, at 961-63. See 
generally Tobias, supra note 171 (discussing the relationship between procedural rules and civil 
rights). Ironically, passage of the CJRA indicates decreased congressional concern about the 
federal judiciary's application of procedure in ways that erode substantive statutes. 
173. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 44-45. See also Paul D. Carrington, The New Order 
in Judicial Rulemaking: Factional Politics is Jeopardizing the Federal Rulemaking Process, 15 
JUDICATURE 161 (Oct. - Nov. 1991). See generally Mullenix, supra note 128. 
174. See Subrin, supra note 5, at 1651; Coquillette et al., supra note 31, at 64-65. 
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 1992). 
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for quite a ride. Already there appears to be some evidence of district 
shopping because of the existence of a particular plan.'' 176 Citizens lose 
respect for the civil justice system when they believe that the procedures 
available, or the character of justice, vary significantly from district to 
.district, that the nature of justice depends on the magnitude or type of 
a specific case, that lawyers' and litigants' resources influence the quality 
of justice, or that procedural technicalities or complexities preclude or 
restrict the vindication of rights. 177 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Recent procedural developments, as exacerbated by the Civil Justice 
Reform Act and its nascent implementation, now threaten the integrity 
of federal civil procedure. Those individuals and institutions responsible 
for maintaining a uniform, simple procedural system must act decisively 
if the system so carefully created and nurtured for more than a half-
century is not to become increasingly balkanized. 
176. Cohn Letter, supra note 74. 
177. See Subrin, supra note 5, at 1651; Coquillette et al., supra note 31, at 64-65; Tobias, 
supra note 112, at 495-98 (discussing these problems arising in litigation with respect to civil rights 
cases). 
